During the last two
decades, several personality and social psychologists have proposed that
individuals may not only differ in their tolerance versus sensitivity to physical
stimuli, frustration, ambiguity, reward, and punishment, but also in their
tolerance of moral norm violation and injustice (Dar & Resh, 2001, 2003;
Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1985, 1987; Lovas, 1995; Lovas & Pirhacova,
1996; Lovas & Wolt, 2002; Schmitt, 1996; van den Bos, Maas, Waldring &
Semin, 2003). Based on their research findings, these authors have argued that
personality differences in justice sensitivity may be no less important than
are situational (Törnblom, 1992) and societal (Gurr, 1970) factors for
understanding why individuals feel treated unfairly when they encounter certain
procedures and outcomes of social interaction. Thorough empirical investigation
of this assumption requires reliable and valid instruments for the assessment
of justice sensitivity.
A systematic approach
towards this end was initiated by Schmitt, Neumann and Montada (1995). These
authors developed a questionnaire which employs four types of justice
sensitivity indicators, (1) the frequency of experienced injustice, (2) the
intensity of the anger reaction to experienced injustice, (3) the intrusiveness
of thoughts about an experienced injustice, and (4) the punitivity toward the
perpetrator. Schmitt et al. (1995) generated items for their questionnaire by
combining these four indicators with 18 types of unjust situations such as
"performing better than others without getting any appreciation or
reward." Several studies were conducted to explore the construct validity
of the justice sensitivity questionnaire.
Schmitt et al. (1995)
tested the convergent and discriminant validity of the four indicators
successfully against indicators for theoretically related constructs
(frustration tolerance, trait anger, anger in, anger out, life satisfaction,
centrality of justice, interpersonal trust, need for control).
Schmitt and Mohiyeddini
(1996) found that individuals high in justice sensitivity reacted with stronger
resentment to a natural deprivation of a desired outcome than subjects low in
justice sensitivity.
Mohiyeddini and Schmitt
(1997) replicated this result for students who participated in an unfair
achievement contest in the laboratory. In both studies, the Schmitt and
Mohiyeddini (1996) and the Mohiyeddini and Schmitt (1997) study, reactions of
the disadvantaged participants could be better predicted from justice
sensitivity than from measures for self assertiveness, trait anger, anger in,
anger control, and anger out.
In a field study by Schmitt
and Dörfel (1999), justice sensitivity moderated the effect of procedural
unfairness at work on job satisfaction and psychosomatic well-being. In line
with theoretical expectations, procedural fairness had a higher impact on the
outcome variables for justice sensitive workers than for justice insensitive
workers.
The questionnaire developed
by Schmitt et al. (1995) is rather long and lacks efficiency. Therefore,
Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbach (2005) designed a short scale which contains
only 10 items. Item selection occurred on the basis of results obtained in the
Schmitt et al. (1995) study and the validation studies reported earlier.
Another limitation of the Schmitt et al. (1995) scale was that it measured
justice sensitivity only from the perspective of a victim. Unfair events often
imply the participation of three or even four parties or roles (Mikula, 1994):
a victim, an active perpetrator, a passive beneficiary, and an observer who is
not directly involved in the unfair interaction but who is nevertheless aware
of it. Individuals may not only differ in their victim sensitivity, but also in
their perpetrator sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and observer
sensitivity. In order to test this possibility, Schmitt et al. (2005) also
developed short 10 items scales for the beneficiary and observer perspectives.
German, French, and Dutch versions of the scales are available and can be
obtained from Manfred Schmitt on request (schmittm@uni-landau.de). The items of
the English scales follow:
Victim Sensitivity Scale
Instructions: People react
quite differently in unfair situations. How about you? First, we will look at
situations to the advantage of others and to your own disadvantage.
1.
It bothers me when others receive
something that ought to be mine.
2.
It makes me angry when others
receive an award which I have earned.
3.
I can’t easily bear when others
profit unilaterally from me.
4.
It takes me a long time to forget
when I have to fix others’ carelessness.
5.
It gets me down when I get fewer
opportunities than others to develop my skills.
6.
It makes me angry when others are
undeservingly better off than me.
7.
It worries me when I have to work
hard for things that come easily to others.
8.
I ruminate for a long time when
other people are being treated better than me.
9.
It burdens me to be criticized for
things that are being overlooked with others.
10.
It makes me angry when I am treated
worse than others.
Response
scale: Six point rating scale from 0/not at all … 5/exactly
Observer Sensitivity Scale
Instructions: Now, we will
look at situations in which you notice or learn that someone else is
being treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage or used.
1.
It bothers me when someone gets
something they don’t deserve.
2.
I am upset when someone does not get
a reward he/she has earned.
3.
I cannot easily bear it when someone
unilaterally profits from others.
4.
It takes me a long time to forget
when someone else has to fix others’ carelessness.
5.
It disturbs me when someone receives
fewer opportunities to develop his/her skills than others.
6.
I am upset when someone is
undeservingly worse off than others.
7.
It worries me when someone has to
work hard for things that come easily to others.
8.
I ruminate for a long time when
someone is being treated nicer than others for no reason.
9.
It gets me down to see someone
criticized for things that are overlooked with others.
10.
I am upset when someone is being
treated worse than others.
Response
scale: Six point rating scale from 0/not at all … 5/exactly
Beneficiary Sensitivity Scale
Instructions: Finally, we will
look at situations which turn out to your advantage and to the
disadvantage of others.
1.
It disturbs me when I receive what
others ought to have.
2.
I have a bad conscience when I
receive a reward that someone else has earned.
3.
I cannot easily bear to unilaterally
profit from others.
4.
I worry for a long time when others
have to fix my carelessness.
5.
It makes me sad when I receive more
opportunities than others to develop my skills.
6.
I feel guilty when I am better off
than others for no reason.
7.
It bothers me when things come
easily to me that others have to work hard for.
8.
I ruminate for a long time about
being treated nicer than others for no reason.
9.
It bothers me when someone tolerates
things with me that other people are being criticized for.
10.
I feel guilty when I receive better
treatment than others.
Response
scale: Six point rating scale from 0/not at all … 5/exactly
Using multi-construct latent state-trait analysis (Steyer, Schmitt,
& Eid, 1999), they tested the reliabilities, trait consistencies, occasion
specificities, and method specificities of the three sensitivity scales
(victim, beneficiary, observer). They also provided the first evidence for the
convergent and discriminant construct validity of the scales. Observer
sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity correlated more highly with each other
than with victim sensitivity. Self-related concerns (machiavellianism,
paranoia, suspiciousness, vengeance, jealousy, interpersonal trust) correlated
more highly with victim sensitivity than with observer and beneficiary
sensitivity. Other-related concerns (role taking, empathy, social
responsibility) correlated more highly with observer and beneficiary sensitivity
than with victim sensitivity. Low correlations between justice sensitivity and
just world belief constructs were found. Few correlations between justice
sensitivity and broad personality traits were significant. Victim sensitivity
correlated with neuroticism (» .30). Beneficiary sensitivity
correlated with agreeableness (» .20).
Schmitt et al. (2005) concluded from this pattern of results that observer and
beneficiary sensitivity reflect high moral standards, whereas victim
sensitivity seems to be a mixture of self-protective motives and moral
concerns.
This conclusion was investigated in three independent studies by
Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, and Baer (2005). In these studies, the effects of victim
sensitivity and beneficiary sensitivity on indicators of both prosocial
behavior (i.e., existential guilt, solidarity, and responsibility ascriptions
towards the disadvantaged) and antisocial behavior (i.e., the willingness to
transgress a norm in a moral temptation dilemma) were explored. It was expected
that beneficiary sensitivity would be associated positively with prosocial
behavior and negatively with antisocial behavior. The opposite pattern was
expected for victim sensitivity. All three studies supported these hypotheses.
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that beneficiary sensitivity is
a genuine, other-related concern for justice and social responsibility, whereas
victim sensitivity is a mixture of self-related concerns and genuine concerns
for justice.
Our current research interest is devoted to the links between justice
sensitivity and information processing. Information processing such as encoding
and retrieving information often occurs congruent with psychological states.
Research on the mood congruency effect, for instance, has shown that memory
performance is better for material that was learned and retrieved in the same
emotional state. Given that psychological states depend on personality traits,
information processing may not only be state congruent but also personality
congruent in many cases. Research on anxiety, depression, attitudes, and
prejudice support this assumption. In three preliminary studies, we tested
whether the principle of personality congruent information processing also
applies to justice sensitivity.
Using the emotional Stroop paradigm, Study 1 showed that Stroop
interference for unjust and negative words increased with increasing justice
sensitivity if the concept of injustice was primed.
Study 2 showed that justice sensitive individuals were more focused
compared to justice insensitive individuals in their information search when
having to investigate a case of possible injustice.
Study 3 employed an implicit learning paradigm and demonstrated that
memory performance for justice related information increased with increasing
justice sensitivity if the implicit learning situation was framed in terms of
justice.
PDF-files of articles
marked with an asterisk can be obtained on request from Manfred Schmitt (schmittm@uni-landau.de).
Dar, Y., & Resh, N.
(2001). Exploring the multifaceted structure of sense of deprivation. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 63-81.
Dar, Y., & Resh, N.
(2003). Social disadvantage and students’ perceived injustice in socially
integrated schools in
*Gollwitzer, M., Schmitt,
M., Schalke, R., Maes, J. & Baer, A. (2005). Asymmetrical effects of justice
sensitivity perspectives on prosocial and antisocial behavior. Social Justice
Research, 18, 183-201.
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men
rebel.
Huseman, R. C., Hatfield, J. D., & Miles, E. W. (1987). A new perspective on equity theory: The equity sensitivity construct. Academy of Management Review, 12, 222-234.
Huseman, R. C., Hatfield,
J. D., & Miles, E. W. (1985). Test for individual perceptions of job
equity: Some preliminary findings. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 61, 1055-1064.
Lovas, L. (1995).
Nespravodlivost v interpersonalnych vztahoch [Injustice in interpersonal
relations]. Ceskoslovenska Psychologie, 34, 203-212.
Lovas L., & Pirhacova, I. (1996). Anxieta, hnevlivost a senzitivita voci nespravodlivosti [Anxiety, anger, and sensitivity to injustice]. Ceskoslovenska Psychologie, 40, 248-255.
Lovas, L., & Wolt, R.
(2002). Sensitivity to injustice in the context of some personality traits.
Studia Psychologica, 44, 125-131.
Mikula, G. (1994). Perspective-related differences in interpretations of injustice by victims and victimizers: A test with close relationships. In M. J. Lerner & G. Mikula (Eds.), Entitlement and the affectional bond (pp. 175-203). New York: Plenum.
*Mohiyeddini, C., &
Schmitt, M. (1997). Sensitivity to befallen injustice and reactions to unfair
treatment in a laboratory situation. Social Justice Research, 10, 333-352.
*Schmitt, M. (1996).
Individual differences in sensitivity to befallen injustice. Personality and
Individual Differences, 21, 3-20.
*Schmitt, M., & Dörfel,
M. (1999). Procedural injustice at work, justice sensitivity, job satisfaction
and psychosomatic well-being. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,
443-453.
*Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer,
M., Maes, J. & Arbach, D. (2005). Justice sensitivity: Assessment and
location in the personality space. European Journal of Psychological
Assessment, 21, 202-211.
*Schmitt, M., &
Mohiyeddini, C. (1996). Sensitivity to befallen injustice and reactions to a
real life disadvantage. Social Justice Research, 9, 223-238.
*Schmitt, M., Neumann, R., & Montada, L. (1995). Dispositional sensitivity to befallen
injustice. Social Justice Research, 8, 385-407.
*Steyer, R., Schmitt, M., & Eid, M. (1999). Latent state-trait theory and research in
personality and individual differences. European Journal of Personality, 13,
389-408.
Törnblom, K. Y. (1992). The
social psychology of distributive justice. In K. Scherer (Ed.), Justice:
Interdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 175-236).
van den Bos, K., Maas, M.,
Waldring,